What is Euthyphro’s Dilemma?
Euthyphro is a character in one of Plato’s works and ‘Euthyphro’s Dilemma’ is named after that character. We’ll get into the specifics of Euthyphro in a minute, but first we need to discuss what a dilemma in philosophy actually is.
A dilemma occurs when you have a limited number of choices and are forced to chose between them. These are called the ‘horns’ of the dilemma. When they are all bad choices, or if they all challenge your belief in something – such as whhether or not God is necessary for morality to exist – it creates a dilemma that has to be explained somehow, or your belief may have to be altered to account for the discrepant information.
A false dilemma is one in which a short list of choices are presented as the only options…but there are other options available that aren’t on the list. When you come up with another option, you are said to ‘split the horns of the dilemma’. Kind of like moving between the horns of a charging bull so you don’t get gored…
Euthyphro’s Dilemma is a false dilemma and is recognized as such by most philosophers and academics, but is regularly presented by popular atheistic sites and blogs as an argument against the moral argument for God’s existence. If real, the dilemma contradicts premise 1, that God’s existence is necessary for the existence of moral values and duties.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
The Euthyphro dilemma as offered by skeptics of the moral argument goes like this:
- Is something good because God wills it to be good?
- Or does God will something because it is good already?
These are the two ‘horns’ of the dilemma.
If something is good because God wills it, then goodness is arbitrary. God could have willed that selfishness and hatred were good. If he had done so, then we would be morally obligated to hate and be selfish. In previous discussions on morality, we’ve decided that morality is objective, not arbitrary, so this doesn’t make sense. It questions our belief in how moral values and duties can be objective.
For the second part, if God wills something because it is Good, then goodness must exist apart from God. This contradicts our first premise in the moral argument, that God’s existence is necessary for the existence of moral values.
Splitting Euthyphro’s Horns
If a dilemma with limited choices is presented, you should always consider that these choices may not be your only options. Euthyphro’s case is a prime example. There is a third alternative…and who knows?, there could be others that no one has come up with yet, but Christianity teaches this third alternative for the basis of morality:
God wills something because He is good.
What does this mean? It means that the nature of God is the standard of goodness. God’s nature is just the way God is. He doesn’t ‘will’ Himself to be good, and kind, and just, and holy…He just is these things. His commandments to us are an expression of that nature, so our moral duties stem from the commands of a God who IS good…and loving…and just…not a God who arbitrarily decides that he will command something on a whim, but gives commandments that stem from His unchanging character.
If God’s character defines what is good. His commands must reflect His moral nature.
Could God Have Made Torture Morally Good By Commanding It?
When asked if doing something like torturing toddlers would be obligatory if God commanded it…you are being asked an incoherent question, like asking “Would a married bachelor be faithful to his wife?” It’s a logically incoherent question because there is no such thing as a married bachelor, so it doesn’t make sense to ask about how a married bachelor (a logical impossibility) would behave.
God cannot issue commands contrary to His nature. The question: “Would torturing toddlers be morally obligatory if God commanded it?” is asking for a description of a situation that is an impossibility. God, at least the God taught by Christianity, can not command the torture of toddlers, or anything else contrary to His nature or His character, to be a moral duty or obligation.
So his nature determines what is good and bad, and his will determines what is right and wrong…and His will flows from the way He is…His nature.
Think of it this way…could you issue commands that are contrary to your nature? Could you command your child to abuse other younger children, just for the heck of it? (Substitute any other child you know if you don’t have children of your own.) Could you will that to happen and command your child to do it, or would your ‘nature’ or character stop you? We’re not talking about being under duress with all kinds of extenuating circumstances that may cause world destruction and the torture of everyone else you know with this example. God is not under duress…and He does not, and can not act in contradiction to His nature.
The Euthyphro dilemma is a false one because there is at least one other choice that splits the horns of the dilemma. This option, taught as part of the Christian doctrine of who God is, is perfectly consistent with the concept that God must exist for objective morality to exist in our world.
Plato came up with his own third option…that moral values simply exist on their own. No need for God. Later Christian thinkers equated this to God’s moral nature, like we just discussed. However, some argue that God is not necessary; that goodness and justice, etc. can exist on their own…this idea is often referred to as Atheistic Moral Platonism and we’ll talk more about that next time.
Until then!
