What is Euthyphro’s Dilemma?
Euthyphro is a character in one of Plato’s works and ‘Euthyphro’s Dilemma’ is named after that character. We’ll get into the specifics of Euthyphro in a minute, but first we need to discuss what a dilemma in philosophy actually is.
A dilemma occurs when you have a limited number of choices and are forced to chose between them. These are called the ‘horns’ of the dilemma. When they are all bad choices, or if they all challenge your belief in something – such as whhether or not God is necessary for morality to exist – it creates a dilemma that has to be explained somehow, or your belief may have to be altered to account for the discrepant information.
A false dilemma is one in which a short list of choices are presented as the only options…but there are other options available that aren’t on the list. When you come up with another option, you are said to ‘split the horns of the dilemma’. Kind of like moving between the horns of a charging bull so you don’t get gored…
Euthyphro’s Dilemma is a false dilemma and is recognized as such by most philosophers and academics, but is regularly presented by popular atheistic sites and blogs as an argument against the moral argument for God’s existence. If real, the dilemma contradicts premise 1, that God’s existence is necessary for the existence of moral values and duties.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
The Euthyphro dilemma as offered by skeptics of the moral argument goes like this:
- Is something good because God wills it to be good?
- Or does God will something because it is good already?
These are the two ‘horns’ of the dilemma.
If something is good because God wills it, then goodness is arbitrary. God could have willed that selfishness and hatred were good. If he had done so, then we would be morally obligated to hate and be selfish. In previous discussions on morality, we’ve decided that morality is objective, not arbitrary, so this doesn’t make sense. It questions our belief in how moral values and duties can be objective.
For the second part, if God wills something because it is Good, then goodness must exist apart from God. This contradicts our first premise in the moral argument, that God’s existence is necessary for the existence of moral values.
Splitting Euthyphro’s Horns
If a dilemma with limited choices is presented, you should always consider that these choices may not be your only options. Euthyphro’s case is a prime example. There is a third alternative…and who knows?, there could be others that no one has come up with yet, but Christianity teaches this third alternative for the basis of morality:
God wills something because He is good.
What does this mean? It means that the nature of God is the standard of goodness. God’s nature is just the way God is. He doesn’t ‘will’ Himself to be good, and kind, and just, and holy…He just is these things. His commandments to us are an expression of that nature, so our moral duties stem from the commands of a God who IS good…and loving…and just…not a God who arbitrarily decides that he will command something on a whim, but gives commandments that stem from His unchanging character.
If God’s character defines what is good. His commands must reflect His moral nature.
Could God Have Made Torture Morally Good By Commanding It?
When asked if doing something like torturing toddlers would be obligatory if God commanded it…you are being asked an incoherent question, like asking “Would a married bachelor be faithful to his wife?” It’s a logically incoherent question because there is no such thing as a married bachelor, so it doesn’t make sense to ask about how a married bachelor (a logical impossibility) would behave.
God cannot issue commands contrary to His nature. The question: “Would torturing toddlers be morally obligatory if God commanded it?” is asking for a description of a situation that is an impossibility. God, at least the God taught by Christianity, can not command the torture of toddlers, or anything else contrary to His nature or His character, to be a moral duty or obligation.
So his nature determines what is good and bad, and his will determines what is right and wrong…and His will flows from the way He is…His nature.
Think of it this way…could you issue commands that are contrary to your nature? Could you command your child to abuse other younger children, just for the heck of it? (Substitute any other child you know if you don’t have children of your own.) Could you will that to happen and command your child to do it, or would your ‘nature’ or character stop you? We’re not talking about being under duress with all kinds of extenuating circumstances that may cause world destruction and the torture of everyone else you know with this example. God is not under duress…and He does not, and can not act in contradiction to His nature.
The Euthyphro dilemma is a false one because there is at least one other choice that splits the horns of the dilemma. This option, taught as part of the Christian doctrine of who God is, is perfectly consistent with the concept that God must exist for objective morality to exist in our world.
Plato came up with his own third option…that moral values simply exist on their own. No need for God. Later Christian thinkers equated this to God’s moral nature, like we just discussed. However, some argue that God is not necessary; that goodness and justice, etc. can exist on their own…this idea is often referred to as Atheistic Moral Platonism and we’ll talk more about that next time.
Until then!
{ 6 comments }
Thanks for your response. I’m not yet convinced that your 3rd option does much good though. The first two options seem to be debating whether the good “thing” that happened is objectively good or subjectively good (as deemed by God). Now, you are saying that good things are good because God says so and he says so because of his nature and his nature is good because…well it just is.
So it appears your third option is saying that it is both subjective and objective. Morality is subjective to God but it’s not really subjective because God’s nature was always good. … hmmm I’m still trying to make sense of your position. Maybe there are some semantics that we need to agree on first…
Hi Again Chris,
If God’s nature is a certain way and does not change, God cannot act in contradiction to His nature, and morality stems from that nature, it takes the subjectivity away from morality and makes it objective. I don’t see any confusion between subjective and objective morality in this case.
Hi Rod, is there any way you can add comment notification to your blog? That would be pretty swell in keeping up on when people reply to comments… just a feature that I personally like… :)
Ok, so I think I understand where you are coming from now. You are saying that morality is objective. This, I think, I knew. However, I would disagree that your argument necessarily splits the dilemma with a third option. You don’t really offer a third option. You chose objective morality. The other choice was subjective morality. What you did do, however, was offer a different explanation as to why morality is objective.
Do I not understand the dilemma? Is not our only two choices: subjective morality or objective morality?
Hi again Chris,
I’d be happy to add comment notification. Any particular WP plugins you’d recommend?
Though it is central to the argument, the options, or ‘horns’ of Euthyphro’s dilemma as presented by Plato were not subjective vs. objective morality, but more about the concept of God.
Euthyphro said that:
1) Things are good because God commands them. This would make morality arbitrary. God could command that we beat up old ladies, and because He commanded it, it would make it good. That doesn’t work with the Christian concept of objective morality.
or
2) God commands things because they are already good. That would mean that the source of morality was something greater than God. There would be a higher moral standard that God was subjected to. This doesn’t work wtih the Christian concept of an all-powerful God.
The third option says the source of morality is the nature of God. This places the source of morality within God himself, and if he cannot command things in contradition to his nature, it means his commands are not arbitrary, but based on an objective source. This splits the dilemma presented by Euthyphro.
As far as subjective vs. objective morality, I think that is a true dilemma. We have to pick one or the other, and objective morality is what makes more sense to me.
I hope that helps explain Euthyphro. I got this from Dr. William Lane Craig, though it has been presented by many philosophers for a while now. If you’re interested in finding someone who should be able to shed some more light on the subject, take a look at the resources page on this site and you’ll find a link to some of Craig’s stuff under “Top Christian Apologists and Scholars”.
Thanks for commenting! I’ll check out some comment notification plug-ins, but if you have a suggestion, send it along.
This assumes that your interpretation of God’s nature is correct.
Thanks for your comment Chris.
Actually, in this case, it doesn’t assume that my interpretation of God’s nature is correct…it just shows that there is another option that breaks up the dilemma and proves that it isn’t necessary that one of the two options in the dilemma are true. Arguments as to whether or not this third option is correct are presented elsewhere on this website.
For the purposes of disproving a dilemma like this, any option that is possible (whether it’s even plausible or not) would work to disprove the dilemma. It doesn’t have to be a correct option, or even assumed to be correct. I happen to think that the nature of God presented here is not just plausible, but probable, or at least something very close to it…I’m certainly not willing to say I think I can articulate the true nature of God with 100% accuracy!
Whether or not it is correct or whether or not I think it is correct makes no difference…it still adds another possible option that ‘splits the horns’ of the dilemma.
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